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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




JORGE RUIZ ESPINOZA, 
 












          NO. 44347 
 
          Bonneville County Case No.  
          CR-2015-10873 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Espinoza failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 request that his concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two 
years fixed, and 10 years, with four years fixed, imposed upon his guilty pleas to 
possession of methamphetamine and felony DUI be ordered to run concurrently with, 
rather than consecutively to, his sentence in a prior felony DUI case in which his parole 
had been revoked? 
 
 
Espinoza Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Espinoza pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and felony DUI and the 
district court imposed unified sentences of five years, with two years fixed for 
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possession, and 10 years, with four years fixed for DUI.  (R., pp.90-93.)  The court 
ordered the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to 
Espinoza’s sentence in a prior DUI case in which Espinoza was facing a parole 
violation.  (R., p.91; 3/23/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9, p.27, Ls.5-8.)  After his parole in the prior 
DUI case was revoked, Espinoza filed a timely Rule 35 motion requesting that the court 
modify his sentences in this case to run concurrently with, rather than consecutively to, 
the sentence in the prior DUI case.  (R., pp.107-09.)  The district court denied the 
motion.  (R., pp.134-35.)  Espinoza filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district 
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.122-24.)   
Espinoza asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion in light of his age, the fact that he has several small children, and his claim 
that the district court was not aware at the time of sentencing that his parole in the prior 
DUI case would be revoked.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Espinoza has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
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the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Espinoza’s age, his family circumstances, and the fact he was facing revocation 
of his parole in his prior DUI case was information already before the district court at the 
time of sentencing and, as such, was not new information.  (3/23/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9, 
p.23, L.17 – p.24, L.10, p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.8.)  Because Espinoza presented no new 
evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that 
his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to 
establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.    
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Espinoza’s claims, Espinoza has still 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.  At the hearing on Espinoza’s Rule 35 motion, 
the district court set forth its reasons for denying the motion.  (6/6/16 Tr., p.41, L.22 – 
p.47, L.7.)  The state submits that Espinoza has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the Rule 35 hearing 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Espinoza’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentences. 
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because of the good graces of my office but, in 
actuality, it 's because of the direction of the 
current Court of Appeals opinion on the matter , I 
think, wi thin t he last fe w years, they --
THE COURT : That ' s the Court ' s understanding 
as wel 1. We ' re not saying you're not a n i ce guy ; 
we ' re just saying you ' re fol l ow i ng t he l aw in keep i ng 
your word . 
MR. CLARK : I fo llow the l aw. I'm no t nice 
at all. I want to make that clear . 
Wi th r ega r d to t he r e sti t ution, Your Honor , 
we will provide tha t o r der to the Court just as soon 
as I ge t do wns t airs and let them know this happened . 
With regard to the request , based upon the terms o f 
the agree ment , we 're not oppos ing the reques t today . 
THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. 
Mr . Thompson, you get the last word, it's 
your motion. Anything you would like to add? 
MR . THOMPSON : No , Your Honor . 
THE COURT : Okay, you're s ubmitt i ng it t hen? 
MR. THOMPSON : Yes. 
THE COURT : Okay, well , the Court has had 
some t i me t o reconsider its decision. I usually say 
this before the hearing starts , but le t me express 






























I know that when I was a defense attorney, I 
used to always be, feel a little un easy whenever I 
filed a Rule 35 mot i on . I didn ' t want the judge 
thinking I was second guessing them , and I always 
felt a little apprehens i ve about it . 
I want to assure you , Mr. Thompson, that 
whenever I impose a pr i son sent ence , especially , I 
ne ver have a problem hearing a Rule 35 motion . I 
understand that taking away someone's freedom for 
that long of time i s a very weighty responsibility , 
and I never mind having a second opportunity to t r y 
to get it right . 
So I actua l l y welcome the oppor t unity to 
take another look at this case with the perspect i ve 
of a little more time passing. 
As I ' ve gone back and reviewed the 
pre- sentence report and my sentencing no t es , there 
were some factors in aggravation that we re obviously 
a concern to the Court , most important of which , this 
was the defe ndant ' s fourt h felony DUI . 
I ' m not sure if that ' s a record , but that ' s 
certainly the most I ' ve ever seen fo r one defendant, 
four felony DUIS . The other another aggravating 
factor is that he was on parol e for h i s third felony 































someone is on probation or parole and the y commit 
anothe r crime , it ' s a pretty substantial viola t ion of 
trust that was either p laced in him by a judge or by 
a parole board , and so I think that ' s quite an 
aggravating factor . 
The record shows tha t the defendant had 
previously par tic i pated in two r i ders , and in Wood 
Court , so he had been given opportunities for 
treatment before and had been unresponsive or 
uncooperative in the past , so I t r eated that as an 
aggravating f a ctor . 
Th e Court con c l uded , pursuant to 1 9- 2521 , 
that the d e f e ndant needed treatme nt tha t could best 
be provided while in custody and that I wou l d be 
putt i ng th e community at too grea t a risk if I didn ' t 
i ncarcerate h i m. So I certainly thin k the d e c i sion 
to inca rcerate the defendan t was proper . 
Now the issue is whether or no t t he se two 
sen t ences , wh i ch I r an concu rrent , should run 
consecutive to t he 2012 felon y case, wh ich was for a 
f e l ony DUI . And I think t here ' s a couple different 
philosophies there. I certainly cou l d have ru n the 
cases conc u r rent , and I considered that ; or the 
alterna t i ve is I run them consecutive a nd perhaps 































to be honest with you, if I didn' t ar ti culate that, 
that's exactly what I did . 
On a four th f elony DUI, I like l y wou ld have 
g i ven the defendant six years fixed and four years 
indeterminate , but instead I gave him four years 
f i xed and six years indeterminate . Let me expl ai n 
why . To me , I think if you have four years go by 
between cr i mes and you make the sentences run 
concur ren t , I just don't see any logic in t hat 
whatsoever . 
Additionally , I think there's a therapeu tic 
bene f i t t ha t ' s lost when you j ust keep running 
sentences concurrent to each other . And I think when 
t h e crime occurred while somebody had not completed 
that sentence yet and was on parol e , to run it 
concurrent just creates the fe e ling tha t the 
defendant hasn ' t fu l ly paid his debt to societ y. 
Now I could certainly remedy that by making 
my sentence run concurrent so t hat they all ran 
concurrent, bu t if I did that, I would have been 
inclined t o add more years . And so I t hink, f rankly , 
and I doubt this will be little comfort to your 
client, b u t because I ran these consecutive , I 
softened the blow on the felony DUI . He would have 































them concurrent . 
And so I do that just from my own judicial 
philosophy and perspec tive, I think it makes more 
sense to soften the blow, but run them consecutively 
than it does to hammer them, but run it concurrent . 
I think there ' s more of a deterrent e ff e ct doing i t 
the way I do it . That ' s my own phi l osoph y . 
I recognize people may feel differently 
about that , and certainly I think there ' s some 
logica l arguments . So from a realistic standpoint , I 
don ' t believe that the defendant really is going to 
be do i ng any ex t ra t ime under t he way I sen t enced him 
than if I had made i t concurrent because I would have 
given him some additiona l time. 
There's other facts , obviously, that the 
Court considered , that I reconsidered at sentencing. 
Not only was this the defendant's fourth felony DUI , 
b ut it was his f i fth and sixth felon i es. 
And , again , with a fi fth and sixth fe l o n y 
for a person that 's only 31 ye ars of age, that just 
suggests that this is a person that 's been in troub l e 
almost their ent i re adu l t life, and perhaps he ' s 
become institutionalized . And if tha t ' s the case , 
that ' s a shame , but we can 't i gnore the r ea li t y that 































public for a significant period of time . 
The ASAM r ecommends Leve l 3 . 5 , residen tial 
treatment , which is certainly consistent with the 
prison sentence he was given . His LS I score was high 
risk , 35 . 
So , again , I, in reviewing the decision to 
see if there was anything t hat I pe r haps d i dn 't look 
at co rrectly or clearly or that I perhaps , in furthe r 
reconsideration of my discretion , I wou l d do 
differently, I just think that the deterrent effect 
to the defendant , as well as the de t er r en t effect to 
the community , is important to consider , and I think 
a consecutive sentence has a greater deterrent 
effect , not only to the defendant , but as far as 
general deterrence in the community goes as 
well . 
If a p erson can keep racking up DUis and 
just have a l l t he t ime run concu rrent , I don ' t think 
that sends the message that I want to send . The 
Court takes DUis , as I know a ll j udges do, as amo ng 
some of the most serious crimes . They ' re some of the 
most frustrat i ng cr i mes , frankly . 
And I can ' t guarantee the defendant is not 
going to d ri nk and drive again , but I can make sure 






























opportunity to do that, and I feel like my sentence 
accomplishes that . 
So I've listened very carefully to t he 
arguments and I ' ve rev i ewed this matter very 
carefully , but I ' m going to respectfully deny your 
request for Rule 35 relief and I ' ll leave the 
sentence as originally imposed . 
Please make sure that your c lie nt is aware 
that he has a right to appea l the decision . He has 
42 days to file an appeal , and if he can ' t afford an 
atto rney to fi le tha t appeal , I wil l appoint one at 
public expense to do so. Addit ionally , there's 
post - conviction relief procedures tha t I know you're 
familiar with, Mr . Thompson , that you can advise him 
about as well . 
MR. THOMPSON : I will . 
THE COURT : Any th ing else we need to 
address? 
MR. THOMPSON : If my c lient, in 
communica ting with him , requests a transcript of this 
proceeding, would the Court authorize t hat, or would 
you want i t t o have to be par t of an appeal? 
THE COURT : Are you appointed or --
MR . THOMPSON : I am. 
THE COURT: Whe r e you ' re appointed, I ' m very 
47 
